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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Clepner Kerik, Julio Bernardo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Delgadillo, Gabriela | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-10-28T15:19:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-10-28T15:19:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.repositoriodigital.ipn.mx/handle/123456789/21933 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Computing the equilibrium point of games plays an important in computer science. A large number of methods are known for finding a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, Nash equilibrium can be adopted only for non-cooperative games. In the last years, there has been a substantial effort in the development methods for finding the Strong Nash Equilibrium useful when coalitions are a fundamental issue. In this paper we present a new method for computing strong Nash equilibria in multiplayer games for a class of ergodic controllable Markov chains. For solving the problem we propose a two steps approach: a) we employ a regularized Lagrange principle to construct the Pareto front and b) we regularized the resulting Pareto front using the Tikhonov’s regularization method for ensuring the existence of a unique equilibrium and make use of the Newton method for converging to the Strong Nash equilibrium. A numerical example illustrates the efficiency of the approach. | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | Instituto Politécnico Nacional. CIECAS | es |
dc.language.iso | en | es |
dc.subject | Strong Nash equilibrium | es |
dc.subject | Pareto front | es |
dc.subject | Game theory | es |
dc.subject | Markov processes | es |
dc.title | Computing the Strong Nash Equilibrium For Conforming Coalitions | es |
dc.type | Article | es |
dc.description.especialidad | computer science | es |
dc.description.tipo | es | |
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Delgadillo2198-base-REPO.pdf | 225.79 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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