Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://repositoriodigital.ipn.mx/handle/123456789/21936
Registro completo de metadatos
Campo DC Valor Lengua/Idioma
dc.contributor.authorClepner Kerik, Julio Bernardo-
dc.description.abstractIn the last years, there has been a substantial effort in the application of Stackelberg game-theoretic approaches in the security arena, in which security agencies implement patrols and checkpoints to protect targets from criminal attacks. The classical game-theoretic approach employed successful to solve security games is that of a Stackelberg game between a defender (leader) and an attacker (follower). In this work we present a novel approach for computing optimal randomized security policies in non-cooperative Stackelberg security games for multiple defenders and attackers. The solution is based on the extraproximal method and its extension to Markov chains. We compute the unique Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium of the security game employing the Lagrange principle and introducing the Tikhonov regularizator method. We consider a game-theory realization based on a discrete-time random walk of the problem supported by the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of the proposed method with an application example in the security arena.es
dc.description.sponsorshipInstituto Politécnico Nacional. CIECASes
dc.subjectSolving Stackelberges
dc.subjectSecurity gameses
dc.subjectMultiple Attackerses
dc.titleSolving Stackelberg Security Games For Multiple Defenders and Multiple Attackerses
dc.description.especialidadSecurity Gameses
Aparece en las colecciones: Artículos

Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
Solis Cervantes2234-base-REPO.pdf59.24 kBAdobe PDFVisualizar/Abrir

Los ítems de DSpace están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.